Ex parte Williams, 895 So.2d 924 (Ala. 2004) (Amicus curiae brief on behalf of injured worker concerning whether settlements were subject to apportionment for future medical expenses).

Chamberlan v. Ford Motor, 314 F. Supp2d 953 (N.D.Cal. 2005). Consumers brought class action in state court against automobile manufacturer, alleging that manufacturer violated California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) when it knowingly manufactured, sold, and distributed automobiles containing a defective engine part. The Court denied Ford's motion for summary judgment and held that plaintiffs adequately stated claims under the CLRA.

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.2d 949 (Ala. 2004) (Class action on behalf of Alabama physicians and physician assistants against to compel payment for assistants’ services).

Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 314 F.Supp. 2d 953 (N.D.Cal 2004). District court denies Ford's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' class action complaint alleging that Ford sold automobiles equipped with defective plastic intake manifolds.

Mack Truck, Inc. v. Mary Witherspoon, as administratrix of the estate of Tonnie Ray Witherspoon, deceased, 867 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 2003). Administratrix of deceased driver's estate brought action against truck manufacturer, alleging liability under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD). The Clarke Circuit Court, No. CV-97-172, entered judgment for administratrix, Manufacturer appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) evidence showed that truck was defective, and (2) punitive damages were to be reduced from $25 million to $6 million. Conditionally affirmed.

Dr. Juan Ronderos and Coastal Neurological Institute, P.A. v. Myrtle Rowell, as administratrix of the estate of Richard Larry Rowell, deceased, 868 So. 2d 422 (Ala. 2003). Administratrix of estate of patient brought medical malpractice action against neurosurgeon and his employer. The Mobile Circuit Court, No. CV-98-3909, denied motion for summary judgment brought by neurosurgeon and his employer, and they appealed. The Supreme Court, Stuart, J., held that: (1) it is the defendant health care provider's credentials on the date of the alleged breach that must be considered in determining who may testify against the defendant as a similarly situated health-care provider; (2) neurosurgeon who was not a board-certified neurosurgeon at time he performed surgery on patient, but who became board-certified in neurosurgery three months after patient's surgeries could not be considered a "specialist" at the time he allegedly breached the applicable standard of care; and (3) physician, who was proffered expert of patient's estate, was a "similarly situated health care provider" and, thus, was qualified to testify as an expert. Affirmed.

Thomas J. McGettigan, Cathy S. McGettigan, and Pauline C. Langham, on behalf of themselves and a punitive class of all others similarly Plaintiffs, v. Ford Motor Company, Defendant, 265 F.Supp. 2d 1291 (S.D. Ala. 2003). Putative class action was brought in state court, alleging that automobile manufacturer breached warranties made pursuant to Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act when it produced automobiles with defective intake manifolds. Manufacturer removed and named plaintiffs moved for remand. The District Court, Butler, Jr., J., held that: (1) proceeds from proposed common fund, comprising disgorged profits, could not be aggregated to satisfy amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction; (2) proceeds expended in notifying public of problem could not be aggregated; (3) Warranty Act barred class action suits in federal court, when as in present case only three named plaintiffs were involved; (4) Warranty Act was not preempted by National Traffic and Motor Safety Act; and (5) named plaintiffs would not be awarded fees and costs, for successfully obtaining remand. Case remanded.

Aaron L. OSBORNE and Bonita R. Osborne, husband and wife, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION , Defendant, 234 F. Supp.2d 804, No. 3:02-0364 (M.D. Tn. Sept. 23, 2002). African-American car buyers brought class action against bank upon whose behalf automobile loans were made, and to which loans were assigned, for alleged violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) in connection with markups allegedly applied on loans to African-American customers. On motion to dismiss for failure to state claim, the District Court, Trauger, J., held that: (1) bank to which automobile loans were assigned by dealerships could be deemed the "originating creditor," in ECOA action arising out of dealerships' application of markups to these loans in alleged racially discriminatory manner; (2) allegations in automobile buyers' complaint, that dealerships, in extending car loans on bank's behalf, applied markups to loans in racially discriminatory manner pursuant to bank policy of encouraging subjective markups unrelated to creditworthiness of buyers, sufficiently averred agency relationships between dealerships and bank to hold bank liable, on agency theory, for any violation of the ECOA by dealerships; (3) bank could not avoid liability simply by delegating aspects of financing transactions to dealerships; and (4) buyers sufficiently alleged requisite causal connection between bank policy and racially discriminatory effect to state disparate impact claim against bank. Motion denied.

William a. CLARK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee., 322 F.3d 1358, No. 02-5062 (United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, March 18, 2003). Member of state National Guard sued United States, seeking compensation for time spent completing mandatory correspondence courses. The United States Court of Federal Claims, Edward J. Damich, Chief Judge, 50 Fed.Cl. 727, dismissed complaint for failure to state claim. Member appealed. The Court of Appeals, Schall, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) jurisdiction existed over member's claim under Tucker Act, and (2) statute did not preclude member from seeking compensation for time spent in completing mandatory correspondence courses while member was in service to state National Guard and not the National Guard of the United States. Reversed and remanded.

Ex parte Wilson, 854 So. 2d 1106 (Ala. 2002). Administrator of deceased wife's estate brought medical malpractice action against doctors and others, alleging acts of negligent treatment and care in various counties. Doctors and others filed change of venue motion to transfer case from county where decedent resided to other county, and the Circuit Court, Wilcox County, No. CV-01-61, granted the motion. Administrator petitioned for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court, Lyons, J., held that action had to be brought in county where decedent resided. Petition granted; writ issued.

Hornady Truck Lines, Inc. v. Meadows, 847 So. 2d 908 (Ala. 2002). Accident victims who were injured in a collision that occurred on interstate after northbound automobile first collided with northbound tractor-trailer, then crossed over grass median into path of southbound vehicle, sued driver of northbound automobile, his employer, and tractor-trailer owner on theories of wantonness and negligence. The Baldwin Circuit Court, Nos. CV-00-638, CV-00-926, entered judgments for accidents victims pursuant to jury verdicts. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Houston, J., held that: (1) alleged negligence and wantonness on part of both northbound drivers were questions for jury; (2) whether employer negligently entrusted automobile to employee was question for jury; (3) compensatory damage awards of $2,000,000 for operator of southbound vehicle, and of $1,000,000 and $1,500,000, respectively, for wife and son who were injured, were not excessive; and (4) compensatory damages award of $1,750,000 for passenger in northbound automobile was not excessive. Affirmed.

Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.2d 795 (Ala. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1961, 152 L.Ed.2d 1021 (2002). Decedent's estate brought products liability action against three nonresident officers of manufacturer following fatal explosion of tire-inflation product. Officers moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Baldwin Circuit Court, No. CV-98-1113, Jacquelyn L. Stuart, J., denied motions. Officers petitioned for writ of mandate. Estate petitioned for writ of mandamus to direct trial judge to vacate an order granting motions to strike certain evidentiary materials submitted in opposition to motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court, Johnstone, J., held that: (1) two officers had sufficient minimum contacts with forum to warrant exercise of personal jurisdiction; but (2) third officer lacked sufficient minimum contacts with forum to permit exercise of personal jurisdiction. Writ denied as to two defendants and granted as to one defendant; plaintiffs petition dismissed as moot in part and denied in part.

Ex parte Wisconsin Physicians Service Ins. Corp., 800 So.2d 588 (Ala. 2001). ln two fraud actions against various defendants, defendants filed petitions for writs of mandamus directing the Choctaw Circuit Court, Nos. CV-99-008 and CV-2000-010, Harold L. Crow, J., to permit videotaping of depositions of plaintiffs and child of one plaintiff. The Supreme Court, Lyons, J., held that in absence of any objective guidelines to assist trial court in making decision, grant of plaintiffs' motion to disallow videotaping of depositions was not clearly abuse of discretion. Writs denied.

Pettibone v. Tyson, 794 So.2d 377 (Ala. 2001). Van driver sued employer's lead maintenance technician, alleging that technician's failure to repair van's brakes was a willful removal of a safety device. The Baldwin Circuit Court, No. CV-97-871, Jacquelyn L. Stuart, J., entered judgment on jury verdict for technician. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, Johnstone, J., held that greater scienter requirement of "intent to injure" should not have been incorporated into jury charge. Reversed and remanded.

Lucia v. Teledyne Continental Motors, 173 F.Supp.2d 1253 (S.D. Ala., Jun 22, 2001). No. Civ. 99-468-RV-S). Owner of general-aviation aircraft brought state-court class action against manufacturer of crankshafts used in owner's planes' engines, asserting state- law claims for misrepresentation, negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, and seeking injunctive relief and damages. Manufacturer removed action on both federalquestion and diversity grounds. On motion to remand, the District Court, Vollmer, Senior District Judge, held that: (1) potential attorney fee award from common fund could not satisfy amount-in-controversy minimum; (2) proper measure of amount in controversy in claim for injunctive relief was monetary value of services that would be rendered by manufacturer; (3) value of injunctive relief to all class members could not be aggregated to reach jurisdictional amount; (4) owner's claims were not field-preempted by Federal Aviation Act; and (5) action was not rendered removable by mere fact that requested relief allegedly conflicted with Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Airworthiness Directive. Motion granted.

In re Louisiana Dock Co., L.L.C., 157 F.Supp.2d 1267 (S.D. Ala. 2001). Vessel owner filed petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability for death of seaman who fell overboard and drowned while inspecting a barge tied to vessel. On claimant's motion to lift stay to allow her to proceed in state court, the District Court, Howard, Senior District Judge, held that: (1) claimant was not required to stipulate that the limitation fund that vessel owner unilaterally offered the court represented the value of the vessels involved, and (2) claimant who stipulated to limitation of liability was not required to also stipulate to exoneration in order to lift stay. Motion granted.

In re American Commercial Lines, L.L.C., 158 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D. Ala. 2001). Claimant filed motion to lift stay order issued pursuant to action filed under Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act and permit claimant to proceed in state court. The District Court, Howard, Senior District Judge, held that claimant, which stipulated that federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the limitation proceeding and further waived the related defense of issue preclusion as to any judgement rendered by any other court with respect to the issue of shipowner's and charterer's right to limit their liability, was not required to stipulate to exoneration in order to lift stay order. Motion granted.

Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000). University student brought medical malpractice action against physicians who worked at university's health center, among others. The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, No. CV-96-1014, John H. England, Jr., J., entered summary judgment for physicians. After student died and his father was substituted as plaintiff, father appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, 792 So.2d 386, affirmed. Father filed petition for certiorari review. On rehearing, the Supreme Court, Lyons, J., held that physicians were not entitled to State-agent immunity. Reversed and remanded.

Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911 (Ala. 2000). Administratrix of estate of patient filed wrongful death action on theory of medical malpractice against medical resident employed by state university hospital and other defendants, based on emergency caesarean-section delivery and provision of aftercare. The Mobile Circuit Court, No. CV-96-161, Chris N. Galanos, J., denied medical resident's motion for summary judgment. Medical resident petitioned for writ of mandamus. On rehearing, the Supreme Court, Johnstone, J., held that medical resident was not entitled to State- agent immunity. Writ denied.

Wimpee ex rel. Johnston v. Stella, 791 So.2d 915 (Ala. 2000). Mother and child brought medical malpractice action against residents in training employed by state university hospital, alleging that they were negligent in delivering child. The Mobile Circuit Court, No. CV-96-157, Joseph S. Johnston, J., entered summary judgment for residents. Plaintiffs appealed. On grant of rehearing, the Supreme Court, Brown, J., held that residents were not entitled to discretionary-function immunity. Reversed and remanded.

Mutual Assur., Inc. v. Chancey, 781 So.2d 172 (Ala. 2000). Liability insurer sought to intervene for purpose of requesting interrogatories or special verdict forms in suit by patient against insured physician and medical practice. The Montgomery Circuit Court, No. CV-98-2355, Eugene W. Reese, J., denied insurer's motion to intervene, and insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, Cook, J., held that: (1) insurer was not entitled to intervention as of right, and (2) trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying insurer's request for permissive intervention. Affirmed.

Ex parte Master Boat Builders, Inc., 779 So.2d 192 (Ala. 2000). Partner sued copartners for damages, alleging suppression, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and misrepresentation, and alleged accounting malpractice as to one copartner in his capacity as partner's personal accountant. The Mobile Circuit Court, No. CV-97- 1471, Ferrill D. McRae, J., denied copartners' motions for summary judgment and alternative motions to strike partner's jury demand. Copartners petitioned for writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court, Maddox, J., held that: (1) Alabama Uniform Partnership Act (AUPA) did not apply to partnerships formed before January 1, 1997; (2) under the Alabama Partnership Act (APA), partner was not entitled to a jury for claims arising out of the partnership business; but (3) accounting malpractice claim was not subject to equitable accounting requirement. Petitions granted in part and writs issued.

Miller v. Jackson Hosp. and Clinic, 776 So.2d 122 (Ala. 2000). Patient's uncle brought medical malpractice action against hospital and physicians. The Montgomery Circuit Court, No. CV-99-148, Sarah M. Greenhaw, J., denied motion to add patient as a named plaintiff and granted summary judgment to defendants. Patient and uncle appealed. The Supreme Court, Lyons, J., held that: (1) power of attorney did not have to specifically give the authority to bring personal injury action on behalf of patient; (2) durable power of attorney was not dormant until patient became incompetent; (3) uncle as attorney-in- fact was not a real party in interest; and (4) patient was entitled to be substituted as the real party in interest. Reversed and remanded.

Bellande v. Terry, 775 So.2d 225 (Ala. Civ.App. 2000). In May 1998, Charles D. Terry sued Sharon Blair Bellande, alleging that Bellande had negligently and/or wantonly caused her motor vehicle to collide with his vehicle. He requested compensatory and punitive damages. The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury returned a verdict for Terry, awarding him $2,500 damages. Terry moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury verdict was inadequate. The trial court granted the motion. Bellande appealed from the order granting a new trial. Order granting new trial affirmed.

Lance, Inc. v. Ramanauskas, 731 So.2d 1204 (Ala. 1999). Parents brought wrongful death action against distributor of vending machines, hotel where machine was located, and machine owner, after their child was electrocuted while attempting to purchase snack from machine. The Mobile Circuit Court, No. CV-95-4253, Chris N. Galanos, J., entered judgment on jury verdict against distributor in the amount of $13,000,000, and denied distributor's post-trial motion for a new trial, for a judgment as a matter of law, for a remittitur, or to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. Distributor appealed. The Supreme Court, Lyons, J., held that: (1) evidence supporting submission of the question of foreseeability to the jury; (2) issue of whether distributor was guilty of conduct which was carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, was question for jury; (3) distributor was not entitled to new trial on the basis of lack of a unanimous verdict; (4) counsel's comments during opening and closing statement were improper comment on the value of a particular life; and (5) excessive jury award was subject to remittitur. Affirmed conditionally.

Whataburger, Inc. v. Rockwell, 706 So.2d 1220 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997). Patron sued restaurant to recover for injuries sustained in a fight there. Following jury trial, the Mobile Circuit Court, No. CV-95-541, J. Richmond Pearson, J., entered judgment for patron in the amount of $50,000 in compensatory damages. Restaurant appealed denials of its motions for summary judgment and directed verdict. The Court of Civil Appeals, Monroe, J., held that: (1) restaurant could not be held liable merely based on fact that fight occurred on its premises; (2) jury questions existed as to whether restaurant manager knew that a fight was about to break out and that plaintiff was in imminent danger, and as to whether restaurant owed duty to protect plaintiff from harm; (3) issues of whether restaurant was negligent and whether any such negligence proximately caused plaintiffs injuries were questions for jury; and (4) issue of whether plaintiff was contributorily negligent was likewise a jury question. Affirmed.

In re Amtrak Sunset Ltd. Train Crash in Bayou Canot, Ala. on Sept. 22, 1993, 121 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1110, 118 S.Ct. 1041, 140 L.Ed.2d 106 (1998). Personal injury and wrongful death actions were brought against owner of commercial vessel, vessel's pilot and captain, owner of railroad bridge, and operator of passenger train, after train derailed due to damage caused when vessel's tow struck bridge support. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, No. 945000-RV-C, Richard W. Vollmer, Jr., J., made certain rulings regarding applicable law, and Court of Appeals granted interlocutory review. The Court of Appeals, Howard, Senior District Judge, sitting by designation, held that: (1) wrongful death claims were to be governed by federal maritime law, not Alabama wrongful death statute, and (2) nonseamen plaintiffs were not entitled to seek nonpecuniary damages upon personal injury claims.

In re the Matter of Thomas Dale Hinote and Christopher Earl Conway, 179 F.R.D. 335 (S.D. Ala. 1998). Former employees filed petition in state court for discovery before action, alleging that they expected to be plaintiffs in an action for injuries and damages sustained by them resulting from alleged misrepresentations by their former employer regarding participation in a retirement plan. They sought leave to depose agent of life insurance company and another individual. After removal by the prospective deponents, petitioners moved to remand. The District Court, Butler, Chief Judge, held that state court proceeding pursuant to Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure permitting a party to obtain discovery before an action is commenced by filing a verified petition in circuit court is not a "civil action" within meaning of removal statutes, and thus is not subject to removal. Motion granted.

American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leahey, 681 So.2d 1337 (Ala. 1996). Patron who was injured in fall at American Legion post brought action against post, and moved for declaration that statute allowing introduction in personal injury actions of evidence that plaintiffs medical or hospital expenses have been or will be paid or reimbursed by collateral source is unconstitutional. The Calhoun Circuit Court, No. CV-93-395, Samuel H. Monk 11, J., entered order holding statute unconstitutional, and post appealed. The Supreme Court, Almon, J., held that statute allowing admission of such evidence violated due process and equal protection guarantees of State Constitution. Affirmed.

Ray v. Anesthesia Associates of Mobile, P.C., 674 So.2d 525 (Ala. 1995). Widow of patient who died while undergoing coronary bypass surgery brought wrongful death action against hospital, treating physician, nurse anesthetist, respiratory therapist, and health care corporation which provided anesthesia. After jury returned verdict which found against nurse, corporation, and physician and in favor of hospital and respiratory therapist and awarded damages of $1.75 million, the Mobile Circuit Court, No. CV-91-2042, Douglas 1. Johnstone, J., granted defendants' motion to reduce verdict to damages cap under Alabama Medical Liability Act. Widow appealed, and the Supreme Court held that trial court erred in reducing award as damages cap of Act violates right to trial by jury and right to equal protection of laws provided by State Constitution. Reversed and remanded.

Smith v. Schulte, 671 So.2d 1334 (Ala. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1220,116 S.Ct. 1849, 134 L.Ed.2d 950 (1996). Administrator of estate of patient who died after physician, while treating patient following automobile accident, administered drug which made all voluntary muscular activity, including breathing, impossible brought wrongful death action based on medical malpractice against physician and his professional association. After jury returned verdict awarding $4.5 million in punitive damages, the Mobile Circuit Court, No. CV-90-001334, Douglas 1. Johnstone, J., determined that award was not excessive, but reduced verdict to $1 million, with consumer price index adjustments, pursuant to statutory cap on damages in actions against health care providers. Both parties appealed, and the Supreme Court held that: (1) statutory cap impermissibly limits recovery in certain wrongful death actions and violates State Constitution; (2) statute violates right to trial by jury in wrongful death action based on medical malpractice guaranteed by State Constitution; and (3) award of $4.5 million in punitive damages was excessive and would be remitted to $2.5 million. Reversed in part and affirmed conditionally in part, and application for rehearing overruled.

Campbell v. Williams, 638 So.2d 804 (Ala. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868, 115 S.Ct. 188, 130 L.Ed.2d 121 (1994). Judgment was entered against doctor in medical malpractice case for damages from wrongful death of burn victim following jury trial by the Circuit Court, Etowah County, No. CV-89-124, Donald W. Stewart, J. Doctor appealed. The Supreme Court, Shores, J., held that: (1) non-apportionment of punitive damages among multiple defendants in wrongful death case was not unconstitutional; (2) failure to advise jury of pro tanto settlement between hospital and plaintiff did not entitle doctor to new trial; (3) allowing expert who had previously been contacted by defendant's attorneys to testify as plaintiffs expert on standard of care was not abuse of discretion; (4) mention of insurance during closing argument did not entitle doctor to new trial; and (5) doctor was not entitled to remittitur of $4 million punitive damages award. Affirmed.

Frantz v. Brunswick Corp., 866 F.Supp. 527 (S.D. Ala., Feb 18,1994). Owner of outboard motor boat brought action against boat manufacturer, steering system manufacturer and seller following accident in which owner was injured when he took both hands off of the steering wheel and the boat veered to the right. On defendants' motions to strike and for summary judgment, the District Court, Hand, Senior District Judge, held that: (1) actions could be maintained under federal maritime law, but not under both federal maritime and Alabama tort law; (2) owner was not entitled to punitive damages; (3) fact question as to whether alternative design was available to boat manufacturer precluded summary judgment in design defect products liability action; (4) fact question as to whether risks involved in taking hands off steering wheel of boat were truly open and obvious precluded summary judgment regarding warning defect claims; (5) general maritime law would be applied to products liability action against seller; (6) owner was not required to show fault in pursuing strict products liability cause of action against seller; and (7) fact question as to whether seller was liable to owner in no fault strict products liability action precluded summary judgment based upon seller's defenses. So ordered.

Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Assn, 592 So.2d 156 (Ala. 1991). Patient appealed from judgment of the Circuit Court, Mobile County, No. CV-89-1030, Braxton L. Kittrell, J., reducing amount of damages awarded to her in medical malpractice case. The Supreme Court, Adams, J., held that: (1) statute setting a $400,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases violated right to trial by jury under Alabama Constitution, and (2) statute violated equal protection guarantees of Alabama Constitution. Reversed and remanded with directions.